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THE MARITIME DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FELONIES
CLAUSE
United States ofA merica v. Carlington Cruickshank

837 F.3d 1 1 8 2
United States Court o f Appeals for the E leventh Circuit
(Decided September

20, 20 1 6)

The Eleventh circuit rej ected Cruickshank's claims that the MDLEA was
u n constitutional; the United States State Department certification of j urisdiction was
upheld and did not conflict with the Due Process Clause or Confrontation Clause; the
element of mens rea was sufficient for the defendant's convictio n ; and the lower court
erred by not providing minor-role sentenci ng reduction to the defendant.

On February I I ,

20 1 4, in the Caribbean Sea within international waters, the United
States Coast Guard seized a vessel carrying 1 7 1 k i lograms of cocaine. 1 On board was the

defendant Carlton Cruickshank. 2 The United States of America charged the defendant with

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine while aboard a vessel and aiding and
abetting possession with intent to distribute in violation of the Maritime Drug Law

Enforcement Act ( " M DLEA"). 3 The defendant c laims that he played no m ajor role in the

plann ing or logistics of the crime. 4

The defendant appealed al leging that M DLEA is unconstitutional ; that the court erred
in denying his motion for j udgment of acquittal from a lack of evidence proving mens rea;
that establ i shing j urisdiction through a State Department certification was erroneous, and that
the court should have granted him a minor role reduction as per U . S . S . G .

§ 3 B l .2(b). 5

The Felonies C lause of the Constitution states that the power "[t]o define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the High Seas" l ies with Congress. 6 Per the M DLEA,

"a vessel without nationality" is "subject to the j urisdiction of the United States. " 7 The

MD LEA definition of a stateless vessel includes "a vessel aboard which the master individual
makes a claim of registry that is denied by the nation whose registry is c laimed." 8 The courts
have "upheld extraterritorial convictions under . . . drug trafficking l aws as an exercise of

power under the Felonies Clause . . . because universal and protective principles support its

extraterritorial reach. "9 Accordingly, the Court found that the MD LEA is authorized and is in
accordance with the constitution.
The nexus between the certification of the jurisdiction and the confrontation c lause is

attenuated. Per the E leventh Circuit Court : "A United States Department o f State certification
of j urisdiction under the MD LEA does not impl icate the Confrontation Clause because it

does not affect the guilt or innocence of a defendant." 10 The Court also held that to not decide
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a case with a j ury trial and to not require a j urisdictional requirement as an element of the
offense does not violate the Due Process C lause nor the S ixth Amendment . ' '
To establ ish mens rea, evidence must be suffi cient so that a reasonable trier o f fact

could have found that it establ i shed guilt beyond a reasonabl e doubt. 1 2 The court noted "[i]n
rebutting the government ' s evidence, a defendant must do more than put forth a reasonable
hypothesis of innocence, because the issue is whether a reasonable j ury could have convicted,

not whether a conviction was the only reasonable result." 13 Here, the court found the

defendant ' s conviction reasonable because of Cruickshank ' s presence on the vessel . 1 4
Minor role reduction may "provide a two-level decrease t o a base o ffense level i f a
defendant was a minor participant in the criminal activity. " 1 5 "A m inor part icipant is ' who is
less culpable than most other part icipants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be

described as minimal . ' " 1 6

The court takes many factors into account to determine i f a minor role reduction i s
applicable through a preponderance o f the evidence. 1 7 They include but are not limited t o : the
defendant ' s knowledge and participation in planning and carrying out the crime, how much
decision-making authority the defendant held, and how much the defendant would ultimately
1
benefit i f the crime had been successfu l . 8
Here, the defendant did not load the drugs into the vessel, take part in planning or

logistics of the crime, and had no authority over the quantity of narcotics being transported. 1 9
The Court held that the inferior court ' s conclus ion t o deny the minor role reduction was
unreasonable and did not consider a l l the facts. 20 The inferior court mistook the quantity of
1
narcotics seized as the sole basis to determine if m inor role reduction was appropriate. 2
Accordingly, the defendants' appeal was upheld by the E leventh C ircuit Court because the
inferior court c learly erred in denying him a minor role reduction.
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